Because the agreement that was reached, which excludes the Eurobonds that many financial players were demanding, also rules out granting a banking license to the European Stability Mechanism that will be set up in June 2012. This would have allowed the rescue fund to procure money from the European Central Bank, thus ensuring unlimited means in the euro zone to be able to help the countries in distress. This option has always been turned down by Germany, which fears inflation and any submission of the central bank to political dictates. This refusal, however, deprives the euro zone of the "bazooka" that would make markets understand that it can cope with all eventualities.

With the reform of the European treaties now underway, the Union has won a little time, and we should still be able to use our euros early into 2012, contrary to what some were not hesitating to predict these last weeks. This is not an insignificant outcome. Whatever the opinion one has on the markets, the rating agencies and speculators attacking the European economies, however, we must hope they will be satisfied with the decision of the Twenty-Seven. Because the price is already very steep: the institutionalisation of a multi-speed Europe, and the question mark now clearly hanging over the future of the UK in the EU.

While these decisive political problems must be tackled, two actions would help make the price more palatable. First, that Germany, now that she has got the discipline she demanded of the rest, be open to the idea that monetary stability can be compatible with a form of solidarity – Eurobonds, or clearer support from the ECB for the weaker countries. Second, that European governments grasp that they must get away from the logic of austerity and lay the foundations for a genuine policy of growth across the Union. For this there is already a tool: the Europe 2020 strategy, which asks only to be taken seriously at last.

“Our biggest national interest,” the PM writes, “is that the eurozone sorts out its problems.”

But just as Germany and others have their requirements for treaty change to strengthen fiscal discipline, so Britain has its requirements for treaty change too. If we are changing the treaty that applies to all EU countries and allowing the eurozone countries to have new rules, it is also important that there are rules to keep the single market fair and open for key industries for Britain, including financial services.

The Prime Minister also warned the German Chancellor and President Sarkozy of France that they could not ignore Britain even if the 17 eurozone members agreed new rules without the rest of the European Union.

The Times also notes that although Mr Cameron still evokes the need to repatriate powers from Brussels to London –

… his message will disappoint those Tory MPs who have been urging him to seize the moment and insist on loosening Britain’s ties with the EU before agreeing to a more integrated eurozone.

In other words, as the headline in Austrian daily Die Presse puts it, the EU has established a European monetary fund – a measure that would have been unimaginable only a year ago. Little by little, pressure exerted by a succession of crises has ushered in a sort of informal federalism at a time when member states have continued to put national interests and agendas ahead of the European Commission. Born out of this paradox, the new stability mechanism will provide Europe with an essential means to minimise future emergencies. A fund of this kind would certainly have enabled it to avoid, or at least attenuate the damage wrought by financial market attacks on its more vulnerable member states earlier this year.

However, that does not mean all the outstanding problems have been solved. As Süddeutsche Zeitung pointed out this week, Europe’s leaders don’t seem to convey the impression that they are sure of which way they are heading. Earlier this month, their divided response to a proposal to create eurozone bonds was discreet, but it nonetheless highlighted divergences between the expectations of member states and the European Central Bank, which could add to the vulnerability of Eurozone countries that are the most exposed to hostile treatment on financial markets.

Finally, the amendment of the Lisbon Treaty was a political act of major consequence that failed to take into account the views of most of Europe’s citizens, who are now forced to contend with the grim reality of economic crisis and austerity policies. For the Greeks and the Irish, the bailouts authorised by their European partners are a source of resentment because they will mark the advent of a period of sacrifice. For many Germans, European solidarity has amounted to little more than a means to extort their hard earned euros. And in other countries, the result of prolonged negotiations between European leaders, however useful it may be, will have little impact in the lives of those who have to cope with unemployment and declining standards of living.

Is this a matter of deficient communication or an inadequate political reponse? In 2011, Europe’s 27 member states will have to provide an answer to this question, because the bid to overcome the crisis will not be possible without the support of Europe’s citizens.

At the same time, they indefinitely postponed the introduction measures to suspend the European Council voting rights of economically non-compliant states – an initiative that was demanded by Berlin, but described as unacceptable by Commission President José Manuel Barroso.

Many political commentators have warned about the dangers of tweaking the treaty.  For example, what will be the impact in Ireland, where the population had to be browbeaten into approving the current version of Lisbon? Will Irish voters now have to go back to the polls at a time when the economic crisis has made them even more mistrustful of Europe? What about the Czech Republic? When you consider President Vacláv Klaus’ dogged resistance to the treaty, can we really expect the Czechs to be enthusiastic second time round?

Let’s not forget that the French and the Dutch populations did not have an opportunity to vote on the treaty, which replaced a European Constitution they had previously rejected. How will they respond to a reworking of the current text, even if it is only a limited one? Isn’t it likely that voices will be raised in many countries to demand the negotiation of a new treaty to overcome the weaknesses of Lisbon?

In short, Europe’s leaders have opened what could be a legal Pandora’s box. But the principle of necessity is also recognised in law, and they are right to take the opportunity to create a permanent mechanism to provide support to eurozone states in difficulty. When the single currency was created in the 1990s, no one foresaw the economic and budgetary difficulties that Europe now faces. The community method, which generates pragmatic but haphazard measures, has now reached its limit. However, in view of the urgency of the current situation, and the fact that a complete rethink of the European project and its method of operation is out of the question, the community method remains, as Churchill put it, “less bad” in view of the far worse alternatives.

Hot on the heels of this initiative, MEPs concluded an inter-institutional framework agreement (FA) with the European Commission that will allow them greater powers, notably in fields of international negotiations and access to classified documents. The European Council, which deliberately stayed away from negotiations on this issue, has announced that it is contesting the validity of the FA and will file a claim with the European Court of Justice in the event that "the European Commission or Parliament applies the agreement in a manner that undermines its interests and prerogatives."

The European Parliament has demonstrated its awareness of the new powers it has obtained under the Lisbon Treaty and its intention to make use of them – and it appears to have the support of the Commission in this regard. Only, the European Council, which directly represents EU member states, seems to be thwarted rather than empowered by the new rules. With this in mind, it is rowing against the tide to maintain the existing status quo. In the new framework defined by Lisbon, Europe’s three major institutions are marking out their territory, and the elected representatives of Europe’s citizens are moving quickly to claim new ground.

One of the reasons cited by the White House for the decision not to attend is the lack of a single counterpart for the US president on this side of the Atlantic. Leaders of Europe's member states were convinced that the Lisbon Treaty would resolve this issue, and finally launch the EU as the global power that it legitimately aspires to be. However, now that the time has come to apply the treaty and to make room on the centre stage for the institutions that Lisbon has established – notably the permanent President of the European Council – it appears that the every-man-for-himself reflex still prevails.

This was clearly the case in Copenhagen, where Europe's leaders were falling over each other to be the first to greet Obama or to stand beside him in official photos. Those with waning popularity – and they were not in short supply – did all they could to extract a declaration of friendship to boost their support at home. It was as though they were convinced that the US President had the ability to exert a miraculous influence over the polls.

The truth is that Barack Obama surrendered his magical powers when he took office in the White House. The spell that he cast over the voters in the United States has hardly any effect on such matters as the recession, the growing economic power of China and India, the dispute with Iran, and the state of play in the Middle East or Afghanistan. If Europe's heads of state want to benefit from a little Obama magic, perhaps they should ensure that EU speaks with one voice on these issues.

Gian Paolo Accardo

“I think there’ll be a moment of: ‘My God, what the hell have we done?’” prophesies political scientist Hugo Brady, as recently quoted on euobserver.com. With Lisbon everything is in place to put the states back centre-stage: an end to federalist ambitions, a Commission president (José Manuel Barroso), Council president (Herman Van Rompuy) and High Representative for Foreign Affairs (Catherine Ashton) handpicked so as not to eclipse the leaders of Europe’s biggest countries. Everything, that is, except the buttressing of parliamentary prerogatives.

Giving more clout to the only elected officials in the whole Community machine is obviously a good thing. But absent a bona fide European representation – replete with parties, programmes and electoral campaigns that go beyond local issues –, this new parliamentary power is liable to be confined in its exercise to politicking purposes.

The hearings for the European commissioners designate might well give us a first taste of what is to come. We know the nominations of Van Rompuy and Ashton are, above all, the upshot of negotiations between the European right and left-wing parties. And the MEPs are already arming to take out a Commission candidate or two. Gazeta Wyborcza reports that the Czech Štefan Füle and Hungarian László Andor are under fire for their Communist past. It would be a pity if the elected representatives, who are expected to take on concrete problems, were to let their national squabbles and the desire to assert themselves take precedence over the general weal. E.M.

On the 20th October, negotiations between Europe's finance ministers – on the issue of how much financial aid the EU should give to developing nations so they can fight global warming – failed. Even a sum revised downwards by half, compared to the one estimated by experts (€30 bn), could not be approved: too many states are worried that contributions will not be divided evenly. Dutch Finance Minister Wouter Bos termed this lack of consensus "shameful", while his Swedish counterpart said he was "very disappointed".

The following day history repeated itself, when the ministers for the environment were unable to reach an agreement on the thorniest issue: greenhouse gas emission rights not used by Central European states. Negotiations also show that "small" states tend to shift the weight of responsibility on the backs of "big" states. While the recent failure on the part of the finance ministers could be put down chiefly to the reluctance of Germany as it awaits the formation of a new government, one can't help thinking that foot shuffling elsewhere is merely a pretext to postpone the adoption of a joint position, and a lack of political will to reach a consensus. In the run-up to such events like the Copenhagen conference on climat change, it above all betrays an inability to understand that if Europe does not speak in unison, it will never be heard. J.S.

Breaking the silence maintained by the rest of the Czech political establishment, yesterday, former president  Václav Havel launched an attack on Klaus's negative position, which he deems to be "dangerous and irresponsible." However, this will apparently not be enough to stem the tide of popular support  for the eurosceptic president – a phenomenon which continues to baffle Lidové Noviny. In conclusion the daily avers that the backers of treaty have a credibility problem: "No politician has been able to convince the public to accept Lisbon, which is a wonderful invention that Europe needs if it is to avoid collapse."

The powers of the head of state are limited and his role should be purely representative. But Václav Klaus’ belief in his intellectual superiority constantly leads him to confuse his office with his opinions, which he cannot help reasserting at every opportunity. And for the sake of self-glorification, he has no qualms about upholding ideas that run counter to majority opinion. A case in point: although global warming is a given for the world’s scientific and political community, Mr Klaus puts out books explaining that in fact the planet is cooling off.

Same story with Lisbon: even though the Czechs wish to ratify the treaty, the president is holding out. Not only that, he turns his back on Europe and flies off to Moscow to open up the Czech nuclear sector to Russian companies. So what if he is not popular in Europe: Klaus will be “the human impasse”, flexing his muscles and exulting in the fleeting feeling of power that gives him. And this tactic is working, seeing as he remains popular at home, according to a recent poll in the Czech daily Lidové Noviny.

On the eve of his re-election in 2008 – by parliament, not by universal suffrage – the weekly Respekt suggested Klaus see a shrink about his narcissistic bent, which renders him incapable of sticking to the role conferred on him by the Constitution. Already viewed askance by Europe as a country that is more than a little “exotic”, the Czech Republic is the big loser in this situation, seeing as the pressure from Brussels is only reinforcing Klaus in his narcissism, whilst that narcissism is isolating the country a little more still, and the debate about Europe is being eclipsed by ad hominem quarrels. M.B.