Only two of the winners were there to receive their awards in Strasbourg: Lybian Ahmed al-Senussi, who spent 31 years in Muammar Gaddafi’s prisons, and Egyptian activist Asmaa Mahfouz of the April 6 Youth movement. Among the other laureates, Syria’s Razan Zeitouneh, a human rights lawyer and blogger, is currently living in hiding, while Syrian political satirist Ali Farzat has sought refuge in Kuwait following an attack by supporters of the Bashar al-Assad regime. The fifth prize was posthumously attributed to Mohamed Bouazizi, whose self-immolation triggered the Tunisian uprising.

"For years, Europe turned a blind eye to the Arab dictatorships" and this year’s awards "symbolise a sense of culpability," argues the Spanish daily. But notwithstanding the European parliament’s condemnation of repression in Syria, "Brussels has yet to articulate a unified response to Assad," and "much remains to be done, if the EU is to respond in an adequate manner to the process of democracy in the Arab world."

Ultimaco denies having delivered its products directly to Syrian Telecom. It confirms, however, that it did sell equipment to the Italian firm Area, which it has worked with for years, but that cooperation has now been suspended pending clarifications of the destination and legality of Area’s exports.

In late October, a member of Germany’s leftist party Die Linke questioned the German government over the export of information technology equipment to autocratic and dictatorial regimes, citing the example of Utimaco: “In many states, surveillance technology is a cornerstone of repression”, he declared, in calling for more stringent export controls.

The question of a boycott will also be on the agenda for the meeting of EU foreign ministers to take place in Poland on the 2nd and 3rd September. Having reminded its readers that the United States already adopted this measure in early August, Volkskrant argues that “the EU should stop dithering and follow the example set by the Americans.” However, doubts persist about the potential impact of an international initiative. Trouw notes that “although 95% of Syrian oil is exported to Europe, it is not certain that the Assad regime will be effectively undermined by a boycott.”

In Syria, the French embassy in Damascus has been attacked by “protesters” supporting the Bashar al-Assad regime. “A further sign that the Syrian regime is losing ground, even giving the impression of being at bay,” these ‘protests’, which the U.S. embassy also experienced, seem to be in response to the visit of U.S. and French ambassadors to opponents of the regime in the rebellious city of Hama.

However, there is now greater justification for intervention in Syria than there was for action against the Libyan regime:  it is not simply a matter of protecting a civilian population against the threat of military force – as it was for the city of Benghazi when the UN authorised the use of air strikes – in Syria, military force has been used against civilians for quite some time.

The question is: why has the EU not adopted a firmer line? Could it be that we have yet to see a sufficient number of images to arouse the necessary indignation to fuel such a reaction? There may be some substance to this argument. However, it is no coincidence that the source of the sternest – and the most credible – demands for an end to the violence and democratic reforms has been Turkey. News of the conflict has come from the thousands of Syrian refugees forced to flee the fighting who are massing on the Turkish border. And their accounts of events in Syria are all the more precious, because the regime in Damas is refusing to allow representatives of the international media or independent observers to enter the country.

At the same time, there is an awareness that we simply do not have the means to force Assad to put an end to the repression. Without a diplomatic consensus – that is to say without the agreement of Beijing and Moscow, which are both opposed to any form of intervention – there is no possibility that the UN Security Council will adopt an effective resolution against the Syrian regime. So a repeat of the Libyan scenario is out of the question. At the same time, the limited effect of economic sanctions – the EU is Syria’s main trading partner and financial backer – has already been demonstrated. The sole remaining option is diplomacy. And in this field if the Europe does not carry sufficient weight to influence the Syrian regime, it should make a more determined effort to support initiatives proposed by Ankara, which remains a key ally in a region where the EU has yet to find its place.

Until now, points out El País, in its approach to countries like Egypt and Tunisia "the EU strategy has been based on the principle of ‘security in exchange for millions of euros.’” The parameters that have now been announced -- free elections, freedom of speech in the press, an independent judiciary, the fight against corruption, and democratic control of security and armed forces -- will enable Europe to measure the level of democracy in these countries. The Madrid daily notes that the plan unveiled by the European diplomacy chief also includes measures for the control of migration flows. However, it points out that "Ashton has denied that the plan offers money to prevent immigration."