Without taking a position on the guilt or innocence of the one-time muse of the 2004 Orange Revolution, who in October was sentenced to seven years in prison for abuse of office, supporters of the boycott want to protest against her mistreatment in prison and the repression of the opposition in the Ukraine.

Tymoshenko’s case is emblematic of the increasingly authoritarian tactics adopted by Viktor Yanukovych’s regime and the resulting damage to relations with the EU: since his election in 2010, the leader of the Party of Regions has worked steadily to bridle the opposition and increase the hold over his supporters – the Russophone community in the East of the country – over the country. At the same time he has blown hot and cold with the Ukraine’s two main neighbours, Russia and the European Union.

The former, which has the benefit of close cultural ties with Ukraine, is hoping to maintain a grip on the country that would transform it into a kind of southern Belarus, in a relationship dictated on its terms. The latter is counting on an association agreement that is now ready for signature, and the offer of a free-trade agreement, which amounts to watered down membership of the EU, to develop the bond between Ukraine and its western historic and cultural environment. Along with what is now Poland, Lithuania, and Belarus, western Ukraine formed part of the Polish Lithuanian Commonwealth in the 16th-18th centuries, and it is hoped that the soft power which the Union is supposed to exercise over its entourage will build on this history.

The opponents of a boycott fear that such an initiative will force Kiev into the arms of Moscow. There is a risk that Ukraine may respond in this manner, but it would be acting against its own economic interests and at the same time undermining its proudly won independence. That said, most Ukrainians believe that sooner or later the future of their country will be in the EU, and Brussels must be careful not to betray this expectation.

For this reason, a boycott that results in politicians rather than teams staying away from fixtures may be the best policy, and it is one that would be made more effective if it is associated with pressure exerted by economic measures (the application of anti-money laundering legislation with regard to Ukrainian capital in the EU) and border management policies (the withholding of visas for figures in the regime responsible for abuses, but easily obtainable visas for students, researchers, businessmen and tourists), coupled with a communications campaign to explain the reasons for this response to the people of Ukraine. Finally, the EU and the OECD should flood the country with observers for next October’s general elections so as to ensure that the vote is conducted in the best possible manner.

We shouldn’t boycott [the Euro 2012], but go to Ukraine, bring some pleasure to millions of Ukrainians and simultaneously do something tangible for the release of Yulia Tymoshenko.

Polish president Bronisław Komorowski is going to appeal on May 9 to his Ukrainian counterpart, Viktor Yanukovich, for the law to be changed and Ms Tymoshenko’s sentence repealed. Meanwhile, on May 8 Ms Tymoshenko suspended her hunger strike, which she had started on 20 April, and was taken to a hospital in Kharkiv where she will be treated by a German doctor. The former Ukrainian PM is serving a 7-year prison sentence “for signing an allegedly unfavourable gas trading agreement with Russia in 2009”.

However, this election will mark the beginning of a new phase of Vladimir Putin’s power. After a number of years of uncertainty as to whether the "moderniser" Dmitri Medvedev or the imperial Putin would emerge as the main architect of Russia’s future, it is now clear that the current Prime Minister and former president will almost certainly become president again next March – a development that will of course have consequences for the EU.

In founding Saint Petersburg, further west than the Moscow of the tsars, Peter the Great wanted to anchor Russia to Europe. Three centuries later, the Saint Petersburger Putin appears to be orchestrating a shift in the opposite direction.

For many people, the project for a Eurasian Union that he presented on 4 October sounds like a desire to recreate a kind of USSR, 20 years after its collapse – an event that Putin has described as “the greatest geopolitical catastrophe” of the 20th century. In practice, it will extend the customs union between Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan to other former Soviet republics like Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, and perhaps even to Ukraine if Kiev chooses to turn to Moscow instead of the EU.

However, this Eurasian Union goes beyond simple nostalgia. It highlights Putin’s desire to establish Russia as a continental power, halfway between a Europe that he no longer considers to be a partner on a level with Asia, which can provide him with markets for gas and oil and a base from which to deploy an alternative global diplomacy. For the Kremlin, China, Iran, India and Afghanistan offer more interesting opportunities than the crisis stricken states of the EU, which have long been divided on the issue of the attitude they should have towards Russia.

At the same time, Russia has not completely abandoned its western flank. It is increasingly present in Ukraine – a country that Europe is failing to anchor to its sphere of influence. It also keeps Belarus under an economic supervision that facilitates the survival of Alexander Lukashenko’s dictatorial regime – a defeat for European values. Finally, it is also preparing to deploy ballistic missiles in Kaliningrad, the Russian exclave between Poland and Lithuania. So although it may be turning towards Asia, Russia will continue to be a problem for Europe.

But there is no reason why this has to be the case. European states cannot eternally treat Russia as a neighbour that is not to be trusted. Vladimir Putin, who appears to know what he wants, will certainly in power for a long time to come, and the advantage of the duration of his reign is that it should give the European Union time to work out what it wants in its turn. Europe should define a firm and open policy towards Moscow. If it does not, it will be marginalised yet again.

For Gazeta Wyborcza, this is a clear sign that Ukraine has returned to the authoritarian rule. “Who called Belarusian president Aleksander Lukashenka ‘Europe’s last dictator’? Optimists. A new one is being born in Ukraine, only seven years after the colourful and peaceful revolution cheered the world”, notes the Warsaw daily’s leader, alluding to the Orange Revolution which triggered democratic change in Ukraine and pitted Tymoshenko against Yanukovych.

Konstantin Bondarenko, head of the Institute for Ukrainian Politics in Kiev speculates in Rzeczpospolita that Tymoshenko may be released from jail if the Kiev parliament passes proposed amendments to the criminal code decriminalizing the articles under which the former PM was convicted.

This verdict – harshly criticised across Europe – could be a major obstacle to the signature and ratification of the association and free-trade agreement which Brussels and Kiev had hoped to sign by the end of the year. According to the Guardian, “with Ukraine co-hosting Euro 2012, former prime minister Tymoshenko's jail sentence leaves Kiev prone to EU pressure”.

The ongoing trial of former Ukraine PM Yulia Tymoshenko charges of abuse of power nevertheless continues to cloud the horizon. According to Gazeta Wyborcza President Viktor Yanukovych has “promised a conciliatory solution” on what observers believe is a personal vendetta against his long time rival. Meanwhile, Belarus refused to attend, after the summit issued a declaration condemning human rights violations in the country. In a surprise development, Polish prime minister, Donald Tusk, unveiled an offer $9 billion [€6.73bn] in development aid to Alexander Lukashenko’s authoritarian regime if it frees political prisoners and holds democratic elections.

For Svenska Dagbladet, the summit failed to urge these Eastern Europe states towards reform in exchange for the prospect of EU membership. The Swedish daily argues that the union should “directly target” the citizens of such states with cheaper and less complicated visas, as well as support for civil society. “This is what could contribute to creating pressure for change from below."

For another Polish paper, Rzeczpospolita, the summit was of “little significance for Europe”. Most European countries “such as Belarus, Azerbaijan or Moldova are as distant from the Old Continent – mentally rather than geographically – as Bangladesh or Guyana”, it laments.

This “individual integration into the EU” should be a warning to the government, which, incapable of solving social and economic problems, could see “hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians obtain foreign citizenship” the Russian newspaper warns. But the real threat that’s emerging is separatism, since Kiev can “lose control over the territories inhabited by the foreign nationals,” Nezavisimaya Gazeta adds, quoting the Ukrainian expert Alexander Gavrich: “For separation, it’s enough that the slogans of cultural belonging be transformed into political demands.”

Until now, points out El País, in its approach to countries like Egypt and Tunisia "the EU strategy has been based on the principle of ‘security in exchange for millions of euros.’” The parameters that have now been announced -- free elections, freedom of speech in the press, an independent judiciary, the fight against corruption, and democratic control of security and armed forces -- will enable Europe to measure the level of democracy in these countries. The Madrid daily notes that the plan unveiled by the European diplomacy chief also includes measures for the control of migration flows. However, it points out that "Ashton has denied that the plan offers money to prevent immigration."

Though reputedly pro-Russian, Yanukovych made a point of proclaiming that “joining the EU is the Ukraine’s key foreign policy priority”. His decision to call on Brussels before paying his respects to Moscow – which he did on 5 March – is hailed as a diplomatic victory for the EU 27, which has been trying to tether the Ukraine to the Western wagon ever since the Orange Revolution in 2004. Even if they differ on whether to admit the Ukraine to their ranks, they share a desire to back the country’s modernisation and shore up its autonomy against Moscow’s interests. And this common stance is gradually bearing fruit.

But there is no consensus on how to handle Russia under Medvedev (and his prime minister Vladimir Putin), on the other hand. The trip to Paris was about natural gas and arms deals: the former have already been clinched, the latter are still in the pipeline. These deals have incurred the ire of other EU members. “France is seriously undermining Western unity,” wrote Romanian weekly Dilema Veche earlier in the week. Were France to sell the Russians the four Mistral helicopter carriers they are so keen on, that would be scuttle the solidarity that is essential to keeping Europe sailing smoothly. But reducing Russia to a pernicious power whose sole object is to sow division between Europeans and with whom no dialogue is possible is not a viable policy.

Despite their historical differences, Russia and Ukraine have one thing in common: they are both EU neighbours and cannot be ignored. In Kiev as in Moscow, Europe will not be strong if its members are systematically working at cross purposes or cherrypicking deals to suit their national economic interests. It will be strong if its member states can agree on the values they wish to defend and if they can clearly define the strategic interests of the EU as a whole – a reflection that goes far beyond the Russian question alone.

Eric Maurice

These fears are not shared by Cornelius Ochmann, expert from Germany’s Bertelsmann Foundation : “He will continue to modernize the country, and nobody can stop the growth of free media and private economy. Nor will he bury Ukraine’s European aspirations – as the country’s integration with the EU is a matter of decades rather than years”.

Hence the European Commission’s decision to relaunch its information and prevention campaign. Its efforts will chiefly target Eastern Europe, where the problem is more acute: nearly one million Russians, 1.1% of the population, are infected. The object is to encourage HIV testing. In the European Union, 30% of the seropositives don’t even know they’ve contracted the virus and inadvertently continue to infect others. This figure is as high as 70% in some Eastern European countries, such as the Ukraine, Moldova and Russia.

According to the economists featured in the columns of Evenimentul Zilei, the new era heralded by these developments will be "a very promising one" for the state, which is thought to be Europe's poorest country. The EU is Moldova's main trading partner, but "Russia and Ukraine also have major interests in the market of the former Soviet republic." Now Romania and the EU will have the opportunity to make Moldova "an interesting destination for investors".