Without taking a position on the guilt or innocence of the one-time muse of the 2004 Orange Revolution, who in October was sentenced to seven years in prison for abuse of office, supporters of the boycott want to protest against her mistreatment in prison and the repression of the opposition in the Ukraine.

Tymoshenko’s case is emblematic of the increasingly authoritarian tactics adopted by Viktor Yanukovych’s regime and the resulting damage to relations with the EU: since his election in 2010, the leader of the Party of Regions has worked steadily to bridle the opposition and increase the hold over his supporters – the Russophone community in the East of the country – over the country. At the same time he has blown hot and cold with the Ukraine’s two main neighbours, Russia and the European Union.

The former, which has the benefit of close cultural ties with Ukraine, is hoping to maintain a grip on the country that would transform it into a kind of southern Belarus, in a relationship dictated on its terms. The latter is counting on an association agreement that is now ready for signature, and the offer of a free-trade agreement, which amounts to watered down membership of the EU, to develop the bond between Ukraine and its western historic and cultural environment. Along with what is now Poland, Lithuania, and Belarus, western Ukraine formed part of the Polish Lithuanian Commonwealth in the 16th-18th centuries, and it is hoped that the soft power which the Union is supposed to exercise over its entourage will build on this history.

The opponents of a boycott fear that such an initiative will force Kiev into the arms of Moscow. There is a risk that Ukraine may respond in this manner, but it would be acting against its own economic interests and at the same time undermining its proudly won independence. That said, most Ukrainians believe that sooner or later the future of their country will be in the EU, and Brussels must be careful not to betray this expectation.

For this reason, a boycott that results in politicians rather than teams staying away from fixtures may be the best policy, and it is one that would be made more effective if it is associated with pressure exerted by economic measures (the application of anti-money laundering legislation with regard to Ukrainian capital in the EU) and border management policies (the withholding of visas for figures in the regime responsible for abuses, but easily obtainable visas for students, researchers, businessmen and tourists), coupled with a communications campaign to explain the reasons for this response to the people of Ukraine. Finally, the EU and the OECD should flood the country with observers for next October’s general elections so as to ensure that the vote is conducted in the best possible manner.

We shouldn’t boycott [the Euro 2012], but go to Ukraine, bring some pleasure to millions of Ukrainians and simultaneously do something tangible for the release of Yulia Tymoshenko.

Polish president Bronisław Komorowski is going to appeal on May 9 to his Ukrainian counterpart, Viktor Yanukovich, for the law to be changed and Ms Tymoshenko’s sentence repealed. Meanwhile, on May 8 Ms Tymoshenko suspended her hunger strike, which she had started on 20 April, and was taken to a hospital in Kharkiv where she will be treated by a German doctor. The former Ukrainian PM is serving a 7-year prison sentence “for signing an allegedly unfavourable gas trading agreement with Russia in 2009”.

According to Polish experts, this is yet another indication that following massive investment in Africa, America and Asia, Beijing is now seriously considering expansion in Central Europe, including Poland, which may become its main partner among the “new” EU member states. But not everyone is happy about the prospect. According to the Warsaw daily -

“... some European experts believe that Beijing is deliberately undermining the EU’s role by building bilateral relations with different European countries. This weakens the EU’s cohesion in relations with China.”

And these have recently been strained. The European Commission is “trying to force” Beijing to open the Chinese public market to European companies, threatening otherwise to introduce regulations that will allow the EU to “retaliate by closing its public market” to Chinese companies.

The range of measures will include: initiatives to develop better cooperation with refugee source countries, most notably with North African states; reinforce Frontex, increase surveillance of the Turkish-Greek border, and improve the management of migratory flows as well as more efficient procedures for deportations and to combat human trafficking.

The proposals have come at time when illegal immigration is the cause of growing concern in Denmark. However the newspaper also notes –

… according to the Ministry of Justice, we do not know how many illegal immigrants there are in Denmark. However, there is some justification for the worry that the large number of immigrants who are currently in Greece and Italy may decide to move north.

The measures are also justified for practical reasons, argues Marlène Wind of Copenhagen University, who is quoted by the daily –

Problems linked to illegal immigration are a threat to the single market and the European spirit of free movement. For this reason, it will also be a victory for the Danish Presidency to have the project implemented.

“Most countries in central, eastern and south-eastern Europe have seen qualitative losses in their democracies, their market economies and their political management in recent years,” says the foundation, which is very close to business circles. It attributes the change to political polarisation and some leaders’ hunger for power. Among the European states highlighted are Hungary (top of the rankings), Slovakia, Albania, Kosovo, Macedonia and Montenegro, while Poland and, to a lesser extent, Serbia get better marks.

But there’s a problem with this, the Hamburg daily writes. On days of strong wind the north-south energy grid is saturated and the excess electricity is automatically shunted east, into Poland and the Czech Republic. The excess power, however, overloads those countries’ grids, which were designed for stable and continuous currents. Poland is therefore considering installing “phase shifters” at the border to turn back the electricity it does not need. If that were to happen the Germans would have to put some of their wind turbines on hold and, to fill the energy gap in the south, import nuclear energy from France.

The problem will get worse if the Czech Republic follows the example of Poland to protect its domestic grid, writes the FTD. For now, though, this small country, which is one of the major energy exporters to the rest of the EU, plans to invest 2.5 billion euros to upgrade its own network.

After last year’s assessments by US Energy Information Administration (EIA), which estimated Poland’s shale gas reserves at 5.3 trillion cubic metres, the news could dampen expectations that Poland could be independent of Russian gas imports for the next 300 years.

Rzeczpospolita warns that even though the maximum shale gas deposits in Poland may be still as high as 1.92 trillion cubic metres, the report may “curb the enthusiasm of Polish and international corporations to invest huge sums of money in prospecting licenses and test drilling”.

On a more positive note, the conservative daily observes that -

Although Poland may not become a leading global gas exporter, [the amounts of shale gas] that have been documented and determined as extractable would cover [the country’s] full demand for gas for a period of 35 to 65 years! A prospect hard to believe several years ago.

More EU member state ambassadors are said to be leaving the Belarusian capital in a gesture of solidarity.

The Warsaw daily notes that -

By harassing the ambassadors, Alexander Lukashenko is trying to paralyze the diplomatic services of countries all too generous in issuing visas to his compatriots.

Meanwhile Rzeczpospolita insists that though "Mr Lukashenko has singled out Poland as “Number 1 enemy" and "tough diplomatic retorsion is a must", a moderate approach is nonetheless advised –

We don't know whether in a year or half Mr Lukashenko will again ask the EU for funds and assistance. If this happens, we must not renounce the demand for political prisoners to be freed, but let's not exaggerate by asking for full democratisation.

“They’ve followed Poland’s example”, Rzeczpospolita is happy to note, stressing that the first mass protests against ACTA took place in January in many Polish cities, forcing the government to “suspend” the process of the agreement’s ratification.

Now also Germany, one of the proposed legislation’s main advocates, is starting to wonder whether to ratify it and that, as we read in Polska The Times, means that the “ACTA is already dead”. The agreement’s demise will likely be signed and sealed in June by the European Parliament. According to the daily –

Politicians deserved their cold shower after forgetting that they should listen to the voice of the people.

Gazeta Wyborcza, in turn, notes that rejecting the ACTA will not bring us closer to ensuring that authors receive “fair compensation” –

Copyright law is imperfect and breeds pathologies [...] we can decide it is a harmful relic of the past and allow everyone to copy everything. But then we’ll need to devise a new way of rewarding creative work.

Polish PM Donald Tusk insists that he is not “100% happy with the compromise”, but Poland will nevertheless sign the pact. Dziennik Gazeta Prawna paints a gloomy picture of this week’ summit, drawing the following conclusions-

Firstly, Europe has broken up. The fiscal pact is the founding act of the new EU, where non-euro countries will become second tier members. Secondly, it offers an excellent opportunity to do away with the myth that we [Poland] are hitched up to Germany and sucking up the benefits. Germany will not sacrifice its co-operation with France on the altar of Foreign minister Sikorski’s Berlin speech calling for more German leadership. Thirdly, we can congratulate France and Germany on conducting an effective policy with clearly defined national goals. We [Poland] just improvise.

On Saturday January 21, the Anonymous group carried out a successful denial-of-access attack on several major state websites and on Monday January 23 a movement calling itself the “Polish Underground” hacked the Prime Minister’s website to post a film of a video blogger known as “Baśka”, dressed up to resemble General Jaruzelski declaring martial law.

The anti-ACTA protesters accuse the government of having failed to consult the public on the agreement and are demanding an open debate on copyright laws that has already begun in the press. “In order to protect intellectual property, ACTA uses a nuclear bomb, the effects of the explosion of which are unpredictable”, warns Gazeta Wyborcza, suggesting the treaty should be reviewed by the European Court of Justice.

The verdict is mainly symbolic: of the four defendants only General Czesław Kiszczak received a two year jail sentence – suspended on account of his advanced age – 86. His superior, General Wojciech Jaruzelski and former defence minister General Florian Siwicki were excluded from the proceedings on health grounds. Meanwhile, Siwicki’s deputy General Tadeusz Tuczapski died during the trial. 

Thirty years were needed for “historical justice to be done”, comments Polska The Times, noting that the court rejected General Jaruzelski’s argument that martial law prevented an “inevitable” intervention by Warsaw Pact forces.

The legacy of martial law, which cost a dozen lives and led to the internment of 10,000 people in prison camps, has long been a bone of contention between Polish political parties. An “effective tool in political struggles of the last two decades”, notes Gazeta Wyborcza:

Nobody wanted to look at it with the cold eye of a researcher. ... [The law] was used to kindle political hysteria rather than to understand history...

Meanwhile conservative daily Rzeczpospolita has hailed the verdict as crucial for “all history lessons future generations will take”.

“We can now regard the myth of the temporary nature of post-accession Polish emigration as refuted. The last census has confirmed that we are dealing with the biggest population loss in postwar history”, notes Krystyna Iglicka, a demographer at Warsaw’s Centre for International Relations.

According to the Catholic weekly, this means that Poland’s migration policy and campaigns encouraging emigrants to return have totally failed. “We are dealing with population and workforce drain and in twenty years’ time we’re going to be the EU’s oldest society, which mass emigration will make a major contribution to”, laments Iglicka.

... one of the last guardians of the outgoing European Community Union. The crisis has exposed a rift in Europe and [the continent’s] shift towards what’s officially dubbed ‘intergovernmental union’, and which actually spells a return to the precedence of national interests over a common European interest. […] The six months of the Polish presidency of the European Council may have been the most difficult period in the history of the project due to the eurozone crisis. There were no fireworks, but no slip-ups either.

For conservative Rzeczpospolita commentator Igor Janke, it has been a “facade presidency”, with the decision centre not with the country holding the presidency, nor with the Council of the European Union, the European Commission or the European Parliament, but in the two capitals - Berlin and Paris:

Today we already know that for half a year, Poland has been a conference centre hosting a great number of conferences, negotiations, and meetings. We’ve covered a lot of office work, a good deal of subject-matter work, but that has had little to do with actual governing.

A Dziennik Gazeta Prawna editorial opines that the Polish government -

... has invigorated the atmosphere around the Presidency. Unnecessarily. It does not make sense to arouse great expectations around a function that, by definition, is devoid of any glamour. [...] Just one example for those who naively believe that Poland has been the navel of the EU these six months - last Friday, the main global TV networks were broadcasting the joint press conference by Tusk, Barroso, and Rompuy [...] until the moment Angela Merkel opened her own meeting with the media. [Then] even that irritatingly and overly Euro-enthusiastic of channels Euronews switched from Tusk-Barroso-Rompuy to Merkel.

Poles from the Pomeranian and Warmian-Masurian provinces, in turn, will no longer need a Russian visa to go to the Kaliningrad Region to buy petrol, for example, much cheaper there than in Poland, rejoices Gazeta Wyborcza.

All this thanks to an agreement on small cross border movement which is to be signed in Moscow on December 14 by the foreign ministers of Russia and Poland. "Russian diplomacy can claim that this Moscow's first tangible success in relations with the EU. It's been years since Russia signed any deal with the EU [...] dialogue between us has so far been mainly ritual", a Polish diplomat told the Warsaw daily.

Meanwhile Russian foreign minister Sergey Lavrov expressed hope that the agreement would “herald completely visa-free movement between Russia and the EU".

“It’s the beginning of an important European debate”, writes Gazeta Wyborcza’s editor-in-chief Adam Michnik while experts quoted by the daily praise the foreign minister for “having the courage” to speak openly and publicly about issues other politicians think and would only comment in private.

However, the conservative Rzeczpospolita doesn’t understand “the begging tone of the minister who sees German government as the only saviour of the EU” while the main opposition party Law and Justice (PiS) wants Sikorski to be tried before a State Tribunal for breaching the constitution and “stripping Poland of its sovereignty”.

In Germany, the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung is delighted to comment Sikorski’s “remarkable plea” on its frontpage. “Leading, not dominating”, headlines the conservative daily.

German leadership is in demand – but (alleged) signs of German ambitions to dominate are enough to make many European ears prick up, make people hysterical even. [...] Germany’s partners have to accept that it holds to its economic convictions which are more or less successful. [Germany] itself has to resist the temptation of going it alone or striking a supercillious pose.

The product of an industrial partnership between the Russian gas giant and major European energy companies (E.ON, BASF, GDF Suez, Gasunie), Nord Stream is nonetheless a highly political project, remarks the daily, which points out that “its route is an act of defiance towards Poland and the three Baltic States: passing under the Baltic is a snub to four EU member states”. Also present in the Euro-Russian South Stream consortium, which will skirt around Ukraine, Gazprom “has yet to get rid of its image as an armed wing of the Russian state”, adds Le Monde.

However, as Newsweek Polska points out, Russian Prime Minister “Vladimir Putin is wrong if he thinks he can dictate European politics by means of the pipe line running under the Baltic Sea”. It will rather be the West that – thanks to the Nord Stream – will gain influence over Kremlin policies. Why? Because German as well as Russian companies have one goal in mind: “the domination of the European gas market”. Gazprom’s plans are ambitious and far-reaching, it wants to conquer French and British markets as well as deliver gas to Austria and the Balkans via the planned South Stream pipeline. This, however, will make Russia more and more “dependent on cooperation with the European business” and more inclined, though reluctantly, to comply with EU regulations.

However, the experience of previous agreements hammered out after difficult negotiations should encourage us to hedge our bets. Markets move in mysterious ways, and there is a risk that this latest summit will have been for nothing. With this in mind, it is still too early to draw any conclusions as to its final outcome.

However, in a context where the response of European leaders was informed by the fact that the fate of the EU was at stake, a quick look at the European political landscape in the wake of the October 23 and 26 summits should be sufficient to tell us that the political crisis, which was obscured by the financial crisis, is only beginning.

As many commentators have noted, we are now embarked on a path towards the greater integration of the Eurozone, and this is a move which will generate a lot of uncertainty.

The highly publicised discussions between Angela Merkel and Nicolas Sarkozy have demonstrated that the Paris-Berlin axis is once again the main motor of Europe. But we are no longer in a Europe with just six or 12 member states, and this motor will have less horsepower in the wake of successive EU enlargements and the creation of powerful internal organisations like the European Central Bank.

The spat between Nicolas Sarkozy and David Cameron, and the Commons debate on a UK referendum to decide on Britain’s membership of the EU are evidence that London is also seeking to redefine its role in what is now a shifting architecture. "Merkozy" will be uneager to offer concessions to the British, who have exerted a long-standing influence on the liberal development of the European Commission, without assuming all the political responsibilities that this would imply.

However, the UK is not the only country to wonder about its role in Europe. The nine other EU members which are not in the euro, and in particular Poland and Sweden, are already grumbling about the inception of what will become a two-speed Europe. The Schengen Area and initiatives for European defence have already set a precedent for EU initiatives with a variable geometry. But they do not involve such a developed level of governance as the one implied by the control of national budgets and the appointment of a European minister of finance.

And here, we are touching on the main point about the instability to come: the economic government that Berlin and Paris are aiming to establish, with support from the Netherlands and Finland, will affect the sovereignty of states and raise the question of democratic control – an issue raised by sociologist Jürgen Habermas in a forthcoming essay from which Presseurop has published a number of extracts.

From this point of view, the EU has now embarked on a dangerous transition, in which its leaders will have to demonstrate their political effectiveness and at the same time keep an eye on the practicalities of democracy: especially when you consider that the ratification process for the 21 July agreement has already shown that national parliaments are very slow when they are required to respond to financial markets. 

Worse still, as Timothy Garton Ash pointed out this week in his analysis of the debates in the UK and German parliaments, national democracies are expressing conflicting demands that have caused the EU to stall. 

But given that no one is ready to establish a European democracy based on a parliament that is elected from transnational lists which take up a position on transnational debates, decisions will continue to be taken by political leaders who meet behind closed doors, and they will continue to be approved by parliaments that have been first and foremost elected to deal with national issues. The euro may be saved,  but the EU is still not out of the woods.

Translated from the French by Mark McGovern

Other contentious issues likely to stir lively debates in the new parliament, include proposals on legalising unions of gays and lesbians, IVF treatment, liberalisation of abortion law as well as legalisation of marijuana. The “swift tempo of ideological disputes in the Sejm will be imposed by two left wing parties: the Left Democratic Alliance (SLD) and RP competing for the same, left wing electorate,”, explains Polska the Times. In October elections, RP garnered 10% while SLD 8% of the vote.

“Companies looking for unconventional gas pay professionals a fortune, employ lots of people and invest heavily in the equipment”, writes the Warsaw business daily. According to experts, each test drill requires a crew of up to 35 people which means that in order to drill a planned thousand test wells an anticipated 35,000 workers will be needed. Tens of thousands more will find jobs providing accommodation, food and analyses. Altogether, according to DGP, the “new branch of industry” will provide jobs for some 100,000 people with the best specialists earning up to 40,000 zlotys (10,000 euros) per month.

The Lisbon daily can reveal that the Portuguese state bank currently holds €1.3 billion of Libyan state assets deposited in four accounts frozen this March, after the international community clamped sanctions on the late Gaddafi’s regime. The first deposit occurred in 2008, after the Libyan leader closed his Swiss accounts in retaliation for his son's arrest and detention in the country.

For Gazeta Wyborcza editor in chief Adam Michnik, one of the leaders of Poland’s democratic opposition under communism – “Gaddafi’s death is not a cause for joy, but for reflection over the nature of the world that we live in, side by side with dictators. Gaddafi was thought to be indestructible, he blackmailed and humiliated the entire world, he also brought European governments to their knees. He believed in violence and lies but he miscalculated.” Michnik adds that Gaddafi’s death was a clear signal sent to the nations still living under tyranny that “dictatorships are not exempt from punishment, dictators are not immortal”.

But Janusz Palikot is not easily discouraged. In an interview with Wprost he hints that his goal is not to create “another political party” but to “carry out changes”. “Polish society will be incredibly transformed, even if we don’t enter any government or implement anything because our proposals will be voted down. It is going to be a normalisation of otherness on a gigantic scale”, enthuses Palikot who calls for public funding of IVF treatment, a clear separation of the Church from the state, legalisation of gay and lesbian unions, liberalisation of abortion laws as well as marijuana legalisation – a message that met with a surprisingly warm reception from an electorate long considered conservative. “Not only has Palikot tapped into a strong anti-clerical sentiment in Polish society, he has also caught a wind of change blowing from the West”, concludes philosopher and columnist Marcin Król.

In his latest book “Poland of Our Dreams”, the candidate suggests that Merkel’s election as chancellor “was not pure coincidence”. Invited by Newsweek Polska to clarify this statement, he answered that Merkel “knows what I mean”. When the Newsweek journalist argued that the Stasi could not have helped bring Merkel to power, the candidate said – "Let's not talk about it." Pressed again on such opaque utterings on October 4, Kaczyński rebuked a TV reporter by asking him to declare whether he was from a Polish or a German channel.

Michał Kamiński, MEP, has told the Warsaw daily that “the attack against Merkel could be the turning point of the campaign.” The former PiS member and Kaczyński confidante turned political foe believes that “Kaczyński's scandalous words make you wonder if this man is fit to fight for Poland’s money.” A Gazeta Wyborcza editorialist notes that “It is not the first time Jarosław Kaczyński has played the anti-German resentment card.” In 2005, allegations that the grandfather of then candidate and now PM Donald Tusk had served in Wehrmacht in World War 2 paved Kaczyński’s twin brother Lech’s road to the presidency.

“that cockpit of monetary policy, which is the European Central Bank (ECB), has been shot through with disagreement to the point where it has clearly emerged among its directors. There is no denying that, in these troubled times, monetary policy has become a dangerous art. In printing banknotes to purchase massive quantities of sovereign bonds, the central banks are going against the principles which justified their independence; and the money that they are creating may one day feed inflation. Not surprisingly, given these conditions, the task of forging a consensus has become increasingly difficult both in the American Fed and in the ECB. But, until now, discussions have been held behind closed doors. In resigning from the ECB’s board of directors, Jürgen Stark has paved the way for a new era in which it may no longer be possible to reach common decisions on the fate of the single currency. […] The Germans are unhappy with at least two aspects current ECB policy: the purchase of sovereign bonds, mentioned above, and interest rates that are too low for their country, which is the only Eurozone state to come under inflationary pressure. There are two possible escape routes: the upward path towards the creation of a European federal state, or a descent towards the break-up of the Eurozone. Given the scale of the problems that have to be resolved, decisions will have to be made very quickly.”

De Volkskrant is highly sceptical about Greece’s ability to pay its debts. “The sale of public companies has served no purpose,” remarks the Amsterdam daily, which points out that “although Athens promised to privatise the equivalent of five billion euros in state property, hardly anything has come through.” Three months after it made a commitment to the troika (composed of representatives of the ECB, IMF, and European Commission) to privatise 1.3 billion euros worth of public assets before the end of September,

 

“the Greek government has executed very few of the promised reforms, leaving the EU and IMF confused. […] The only state property that has been sold is a small holding in a telephone company, worth 390 million euros. […] There have been several projects to sell the national lottery, which have all proved to be empty political posturing. In the end excuses were invented, and none of the deals were finalised.”

Spain is particularly worried about the reprecussions of the Greek crisis: "The possibility of Greece going bankrupt in October  threatens Spain," headlines El Mundo. At a time when the risk premium on Spanish debt has crossed the alert threshold of 370 points "in spite of massive bond purchases made by the European  Central Bank" (ECB), the daily argues that "the Greek crisis has created the need for an economic agreement that will have to be pushed through before the 20-N” (the early general elections in Spain, slated for the 20 November).

"The extreme vulnerability of this situation should force [Prime Minister José Luis] Zapatero to zealously implement the necessary reforms, but instead the leader of the government has led us into a labyrinth. In calling for a general election four months ahead of time, he has halted any progress. The enactment of key economic reforms has been neglected by his government, to the point where Europe, precisely because of this lack of effectiveness, was forced to insist that it approve changes to the consitution [to introduce the 'golden rule' for budgetary stability].” "The only possible option now is for Zapatero to retake control of the situation by quickly convening a meeting with [right-wing opposition leader Mariano] Rajoy and [socialist candidate Alfredo Pérez] Rubalcaba, so that they can accelerate the implementation of structural measures, like the modification of collective bargaining procedures and the introduction of more effective labour market reform, which the Spanish economy will need in the coming years."

Countries where the single currency has yet to be adopted, are worried that they may be sidelined in decisions in decisions about the future of the euro. “Poland wants to decide the the euro’s fate,” headlines Dziennik Gazeta Prawna, which reports on yesterday’s meeting of Polish, Czech, Hungarian, Romanian, Bulgarian, Lithuanian and Latvian representatives in Brussels who were trying to work out a “common position concerning the vision of tightening co-operation within the euro zone.” The Warsaw economic daily hints that at the EU summit in October and December a decision “on starting negotiations on changing the Lisbon Treaty and transforming the currency union into the fiscal one” will surely be taken. 

“Poland is building a coalition of countries willing to adopt the euro and therefore demand the right to participate in the debate about the shape of the currency union. Warsaw doesn’t want decisions about its future to be made only in Berlin or Paris.”

Gazeta Wyborcza's editorial points out however, that the new law, although it does reduce the number of subjects taught in Polish and will undoubtedly cause some Polish schools to close down, does not discriminate against Poles in Lithuania, but only brings them closer to “the standards of education enjoyed by national minorities in other EU countries”. According to the Warsaw daily, the setting up of the bilateral education committee may be “the first step to resolving other crucial issues for the Polish minority”, which include compensation for the Polish property seized by the Soviet Union after WWII and the right to public signs in two languages. “Lithuania must understand that (...) fundamental minority rights in the EU are not just a Polish folly”, but “a call to comply with EU standards”, concludes Gazeta Wyborcza.