“Most countries in central, eastern and south-eastern Europe have seen qualitative losses in their democracies, their market economies and their political management in recent years,” says the foundation, which is very close to business circles. It attributes the change to political polarisation and some leaders’ hunger for power. Among the European states highlighted are Hungary (top of the rankings), Slovakia, Albania, Kosovo, Macedonia and Montenegro, while Poland and, to a lesser extent, Serbia get better marks.

... the quality of Kosovo-Serbian relationships, even after a year of negotiations, has changed little. The two countries still do not recognise each other’s legitimacy, hence the need to continue the discussions to arrive at a stable relationship.

... For Pristina, the negotiations may eventually lead to its recognition by the five European countries that have not yet endorsed its independence (Cyprus, Spain, Romania, Slovakia and Greece) and the establishment of a new legal framework. The failure to define the legal status of Kosovo, however, requires a new resolution from the UN Security Council – with Serbia’s assent. The EU is still offering Kosovo the chance to join the EU and is promising it a feasibility study on its integration, though without actually opening up the Stabilisation and Association process. Serbia, however, was able to obtain EU candidate status, because it entered the negotiations with clear goals.

... Brussels entered the negotiations to unblock the status quo and do more to attract Serbia to the EU, thus demonstrating its own usefulness. Kosovo entered the negotiations without a clear definition of goals… Serbia, finally, has stayed focused on candidate status while continuing to challenge the independence, sovereignty and functionality of Kosovo – an objective it has clearly achieved. Kosovo, on the other hand, has lost its chance to normalise the situation. Each country will soon enter its election cycle – a phase of “normal” instability. Negotiations for Serbian membership in the EU will not commence unless the Serbian and Kosovar political situations are clarified and stable. And it is Brussels that will signal the time when they may sit once more around a table to unblock the status quo.

Another Serbian newspaper, Blic, emphasises that Belgrade had not expected such a tough line from the German Chancellor and asks whether the government or the international community has not deceived the Serbian people by telling them “that Kosovo and the EU were two separate issues – that is, EU membership has nothing to do with the loss of Kosovo.”

In Germany, the Frankfurter Rundschau reports that “when it comes to membership issues, the Balkans, if one is to believe the European Commission, are ‘on the right track’. Each step ahead is acclaimed with stiff solemnity.” But “those who lived under communism feel instinctively that it is not the formal announcements that count, but progress on the basic issues. No wonder there are anxious fears afoot in the Balkans: 'Do they really want us in? And what will it cost?”

Though it may well be a coincidence, it is nonetheless interesting to note that the arrest took place in the same week when Croatia was informed that negotiations on its accession will not be concluded as previously scheduled before the end of June. As Novi List noted early this week: "The EU’s new enlargement is a strategic decision that has prompted another geopolitical tug-of-war between Western countries." The Croat daily goes on to point out: "Just as it was at the beginning of the 1990s, on one side we have a group of nations led by Germany and Austria along with the countries of the Visegrád group (Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia) that are staunch supporters of the rapid accession of Croatia, which they believe has been the victim of prejudice for too long. On the other, we have Great Britain and its main continental allies – the Netherlands, Denmark, and the Scandinavian countries – who want negotiations to be concluded at the end of the year, at a time when Serbia can fulfill the conditions to apply for EU membership." And this scenario has now been made possible by the Mladić’s arrest. But Europe’s 27 member states will have to exercise careful judgment because the Balkan region remains a hotbed of potential crises.

In Belgrade, it is still too early to evaluate the political consequences of Mladić’s arrest, while in Zagreb, The Hague’s recent sentencing of General Gotovina has reinforced hostility to the EU. And in both countries, corruption and excessive nationalism still present a threat to a trouble free accession. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, the same Serbs who were led by Mladić are threatening to organise a referendum on their independence – a development that would put an end to the precarious peace that has reigned there since 1995. And in Kosovo, a state that is still not recognized by five members of the EU, where crime and corruption continue to thrive, the possibility of a separation between Serbian and Albanian territories remains a threat to regional equilibrium.

On the eve of Mladić’s arrest, the Commissioner for Enlargement and European Neighbourhood Policy, Stefan Fülle, presented the EU’s new strategy for the countries on its borders, which is mainly focused on Arab states, and to the detriment of countries like Belarus, Ukraine and Georgia, which until now  had been given priority treatment – highlighting what appears to be an inability on the part of the EU to apply a consistent policy for all of its neighbours. The Balkans are situated at a meeting point of the perspectives of enlargement and neighbourhood policy, with Croatia and now Serbia leading the way. But the effort that will be required to integrate both of these countries should not pave the way for a neglect of the rest of the region. Mladić’s arrest is just one chapter in a story that could have many different outcomes.

And things might well continue at the same pace. Following the summit of the "Big four" European powers set for 6 September – that the Belgian EU presidency threatens to boycott, fearing that its real purpose is to legitimise France's expulsions of the Roma  – there will be a meeting of foreign ministers, who are to discuss, among other topics, the issue of Kosovo (Berlin has suggested to Serbia that they would have an open door into the EU if they recognised Kosovo's autonomy). There is also the (less than inspiring) state of justice in Bulgaria and Romania, both trying to be a part of the Schengen zone. Next up are the referendum on the presidential election in Moldavia (a requisite condition for pursuing negotiations toward an eventual membership in the Schengen area), as well as one on Constitutional reforms in Turkey (ditto), not to mention the legislative elections in Sweden. Which leaves a lot on the plate of the Union's unusually quiet Belgian presidency, whose first hundred days will soon be coming to an end.

Iulia Badea Guéritée

The Kosovans are angry because they were not consulted by EULEX before it signed the agreement with Belgrade, which they believe is an affront to Kosovan sovereignty. As the TAZ  report explains, Belgrade only negotiates with EULEX, because direct negotiations with Pristina would imply a recognition of the independence of the former Serbian province, "which it wishes to avoid at all costs." In protest against the agreement, members of the hardline nationalist Self-determination Movement, which is opposed to any foreign presence in Kosovo, burned about 30 vehicles belonging to EULEX.