At the extraordinary informal summit of 23 May, EU leaders agreed that the issue is no longer taboo and that each was studying the issue for themselves. At the same time they repeated their wish that Greece should remain in the eurozone – provided, of course, that it honour the commitments to its creditors. And there lies the central rub of the question: more than it is a question of economics, the “Grexit” is pre-eminently a political issue – just as was Greece’s joining the eurozone at a time when officials in Brussels and elsewhere knew very well that, like the Italians before them, the Greeks were not ready.

It is up to Europe’s leaders to decide whether or not they are willing to assume the economic costs to their banks and their taxpayers of a Greece exit from the eurozone – and the political costs too: loss of credibility of the single currency, the breakdown of the European integration model, and the flight of the "Cradle of Democracy", to name just a few. Their Greek counterparts, on the other hand, must decide how far they are willing to respect their commitments or, if they want to go back on them, how they intend to do so.

As for their exit from the eurozone, it seems not to be an option either for them or for most of their constituents. And it is precisely because the political and economic costs of a “Grexit” would be too high for both the Greeks and their partners that it is reasonable to bet on a “softer” outcome, which ought to be emerge following the June 17 parliamentary elections in Greece and France. 

Europeans will probably end up accepting a new restructuring and debt rescheduling for Greece, which will give a breather to a population tested by two years of severe austerity. Likely to be governed by an unprecedented majority and monitored closely by the EU-ECB-IMF “troika”, the Greeks will be forced to reform a state that has proved unjust and inefficient and to stop exploiting the crisis, the consequences of which are plain to all.

Today, in the aftermath of elections that have demonstrated the strength of those opposed to austerity policies demanded by the EU and the IMF and the steep decline in support for the major traditional parties in the country, a Grexit is more than just a rhetorical threat, but a real hypothesis – and one which could definitively materialise in the re-run of elections scheduled for 17 June.

But should we be convinced that a Grexit is the solution? The economists and politicians who have weighed the pros and cons of such a move have failed to provide a convincing case for a Eurozone either with or without Greece. Rather, as Il Sole-24 Ore has noted, the current debate resembles a bluff – and a particularly dangerous bluff for all involved.

Europeans are faced with an impossible choice. A decision to expel Greece from the Eurozone, in a procedure not covered by any European treaty, could result in a loss of confidence in the entire European economic system and undermine the credibility of the EU both as a political project and as world power. At the same time, a drive to maintain the status quo will not only perpetuate policies that are destroying Greece’s social fabric and weaken the cause of democracy in a country that was –  as we never tire of saying –  its birthplace, but it will also expose Europe to the risk of spending billions of euros for nothing, because the Greek state is now to all intents and purposes a fiction.

In response to a dilemma which has emerged over the fate of a country that accounts for less than 3% of its GDP, Europe has been unable to provide an effective solution. Instead it has been caught in a deadlock arising from its own equivocal status: it is too integrated, both economically and politically, not to be endangered by the Greek crisis, but not sufficiently integrated to provide itself with the means it needs to overcome such an obstacle. Without the single currency and without the single market, it would have been easier to allow the Greeks to default and devalue their currency. At the same time, with the mechanisms for increased coordination of budgetary policies and measures that allow for the imposition of reforms in Greece, particularly with regard to the collection of taxes and the fight against corruption, Europe may be able to push the country towards recovery.

But how can we say to the people of Europe that the solution to the current crisis is more Europe? EU leaders are now paying the bill for more than two decades (from the 1986 Single European Act to the 2009 Lisbon Treaty) of accelerated progress on a road to European integration paved with promises of prosperity which has consistently avoided the issue of democracy in the Union.

Now that the wear and tear on Europe’s institutions has been compounded by the debt crisis, the European project has been caught like a Minotaur lost in a labyrinth, where it is vainly seeking a way out. Or should we say… a “Grexit”?

Without taking a position on the guilt or innocence of the one-time muse of the 2004 Orange Revolution, who in October was sentenced to seven years in prison for abuse of office, supporters of the boycott want to protest against her mistreatment in prison and the repression of the opposition in the Ukraine.

Tymoshenko’s case is emblematic of the increasingly authoritarian tactics adopted by Viktor Yanukovych’s regime and the resulting damage to relations with the EU: since his election in 2010, the leader of the Party of Regions has worked steadily to bridle the opposition and increase the hold over his supporters – the Russophone community in the East of the country – over the country. At the same time he has blown hot and cold with the Ukraine’s two main neighbours, Russia and the European Union.

The former, which has the benefit of close cultural ties with Ukraine, is hoping to maintain a grip on the country that would transform it into a kind of southern Belarus, in a relationship dictated on its terms. The latter is counting on an association agreement that is now ready for signature, and the offer of a free-trade agreement, which amounts to watered down membership of the EU, to develop the bond between Ukraine and its western historic and cultural environment. Along with what is now Poland, Lithuania, and Belarus, western Ukraine formed part of the Polish Lithuanian Commonwealth in the 16th-18th centuries, and it is hoped that the soft power which the Union is supposed to exercise over its entourage will build on this history.

The opponents of a boycott fear that such an initiative will force Kiev into the arms of Moscow. There is a risk that Ukraine may respond in this manner, but it would be acting against its own economic interests and at the same time undermining its proudly won independence. That said, most Ukrainians believe that sooner or later the future of their country will be in the EU, and Brussels must be careful not to betray this expectation.

For this reason, a boycott that results in politicians rather than teams staying away from fixtures may be the best policy, and it is one that would be made more effective if it is associated with pressure exerted by economic measures (the application of anti-money laundering legislation with regard to Ukrainian capital in the EU) and border management policies (the withholding of visas for figures in the regime responsible for abuses, but easily obtainable visas for students, researchers, businessmen and tourists), coupled with a communications campaign to explain the reasons for this response to the people of Ukraine. Finally, the EU and the OECD should flood the country with observers for next October’s general elections so as to ensure that the vote is conducted in the best possible manner.

However, this schedule may be disturbed by the result of another 6 May vote, the general elections in Greece. Whereas Nicolas Sarkozy’s defeat can in part be explained by the “curse” that currently weighs on outgoing leaders in Europe – in the last two years, only Poland’s Donald Tusk has succeeded in winning an election – Sunday’s Greek vote has all the trappings of a revolt against the country’s political system. Thus the result is particularly bad news for the EU and the IMF, which, in spite of its faults and responsibility for the current crisis, depend on this political system to implement the economic and restructuring measures demanded of Greece in exchange for financial aid.

At first glance, François Hollande’s victory could be a godsend for PASOK or New Democracy, both of whom need to demonstrate that they can exert some influence over demands made by the troika. But with barely a third of the vote between them, and a combined total of just 152 seats in a parliament where a majority requires 151, in all likelihood they will be unable to form a coalition in the event that they decide to do so. On this basis, it is hard to see how they can derive any advantage from the impact of Hollande’s election.

Now that PASOK, which won elections in 2009, has been relegated to third place by the radical left, and in view of the fact that power in any future parliament will be fragmented among small parties, including the neo-Nazi Golden Dawn, the most likely outcome of the 6 May vote will be yet another election, and one that can only add to the ongoing uncertainty in Europe.

Fears over respect for the conditions of the bailout supervised by the troika and Greece’s future in the Eurozone were immediately apparent on financial markets in the aftermath of the election. In Berlin, the Chancellor’s office was quick to point out that there was no possibility of renegotiating the budgetary pact signed in March. So if there is a debate on growth, it will be one that is conducted in a difficult context. And the French socialist joy expressed in yesterday’s celebration at the Bastille may be short-lived.